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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the outcome of decentralized decision making by local 
governments in provision of private good, and examines its efficiency. In the setting 
of a two-region economy, each local government decides whether to provide the service, 
then chooses user fees and taxes, so as to maximize the utility of its residents. At 
equilibrium, the local government imposes discriminatory fees for service users from 
other region. There exists four patterns of provision as Nash equilibrium, including 
the case of multiple equilibria, and conditions for each emerging are derived. We 
formulate and solve the optimizing problem to obtain Pareto-efficient allocation with 
respect to patterns of provision, user fees and taxes. Comparing equilibrium and 
optimal solutions, it turns out that competition among governments may lead to either 




  The literature on local public economics has focused on the provision of public good as a main 
role of local governments. In reality, however, many services provided by local governments do 
not necessarily have the property of public good. For example, schools, gymnasiums, recreational 
facilities and museums are considered as private good in an economic sense: providers of these 
services can exclude free-riders whereas the marginal cost for providing the service to an additional 
user is significantly positive. Many local governments provide these services since they generate 
externalities or for other reasons that they are not efficiently provided by private firms. 
  In an economy consisting of many regions, while each local government makes decisions 
considering only the welfare of residents in its jurisdiction, policy of one local government affects 
benefits and costs of other regions. Concerning the public good provision, there is already a 
substantial body of literature that investigates the consequences of decentralized ecision making by 
local governments ( ee Wildasin (1987) for an overview). On the other hand, despite the 
significance inthe real world, relatively little attention has been paid in the literature to private good 
provision by local governments. One distinctive feature of private good provision is that it 
involves the decision on pricing (i. e., setting the user fees for such services). It is unclear whether 
decentralized decision-making by local governments with respect to provision of private good and 
user fee setting is socially desirable. Answering this question is the objective of this paper. 
  Public provision of private good has been studied by a few scholars, such as Besley (1991), 
Besley and Coate (1991), Munro (1991), and Epple and Romano (1996). However, they mainly 
deal with the case when everyone consumes a uniform amount of the service and fees are not 
charged (such as elementary and secondary education). We instead focus on the case that each 
individual chooses the consumption level of the service provided by the local government. This 
case seems more relevant o the services provided by local governments, such as a concert hall, a 
stadium, agymnasium, and education i  public universities. In this case, pricing is an important 
policy instrument for local governments, which does not arise in the case of public good provision. 
Although the literature of public sector pricing has dealt with related problems, it has mainly 
focused on the situation of natural monopoly, such as electricity, water supply, or transportation 
(Bos (1985), Vogelsang (1990)). We need to develop amodel for the economy with many regions, 
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in which services are provided not by single but by multiple public agents'. Note that, in an 
economy with multiple regions, people easily visit other regions to use the service provided there. 
In the case of public good, this is the spill-over problem, and many efforts have been devoted to 
deal with this problem, inter alia by Williams(1966), Kuroda (1989), Tsukahara(1995), and Cremer, 
Marchand and Pestieau (1997). In the case of private good, however, the characteristics of the 
problem are different: the local government as a provider can charge the fees for users from other 
regions. It is even possible to charge higher fees for users from other regions if each user can be 
identified. Such discriminatory pricing are implemented in the real world. Table 1 demonstrates 
an example of public universities inJapan. The table shows that students from other regions have 
to pay higher entrance f es than those in the university's home region. It is more advantageous to 
have service users from other regions and raise the fee revenue than to exclude those uses. We 
present aformal economic model describing the phenomenon reported above'.
Table 1
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of a two-region economy in 
which each local government decides whether to provide the service, then chooses fee of the service 
and the tax, so as to maximize utility of its residents. We investigate the properties of the 
equilibrium solutions as the outcome of decentralized decision making by local governments. In 
Section 3, we formulate and solve the planning problem to obtain Pareto-efficient allocation with 
respect to patterns of provision, user fees and taxes. Comparing Nash equilibria with efficient 
solutions, we evaluate the efficiency of decentralized provision. Section 4 concludes the paper.
' It is considered inthe literature that competition among public enterprises is quite rare (Vogelsang 
(1990)). Instead, agrowing number of researchers are interested inmixed oligopoly market where 
the public enterprise competes with private firms. 
2 Takahashi (2000) investigates spatial competition between two governments in provision of 
excludable good with non-rivalry. In his model, oligopolistic price competition is a source of 
distortion. Our model has a different mechanism that discriminatory pricing leads to inefficient 
provision. 
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2.The Model
2-1 The setting 
   Suppose that the economy consists of two regions, each of which has its own local government. 
There are N households in the economy and the number of households in each region is 
exogenously given. Thus N = ni + n2 holds, where n; (i =1,2) is the number of households in
region i. They are identical with respect to preferences and income. 
   We concentrate our attention to the private good provision as a role of local government; other 
activities are omitted in the analysis. We assume that the private good considered in this paper is 
not essential for human living. Universities and recreational facilities correspond to such type of 
services. This assumption allows the case that such a service might not be provided by any of the 
regions. We further assume that the quality of the service is identical regardless of the place of 
provision. 
   Each local government seeks to maximize utility levels of its residents. It decides whether to 
provide the service, then chooses a fee for the service and the tax to finance the expenditures for its 
provision.
2-2 Behavior of a household 
  Utility of a household epends on the consumption ofcomposite good (numeraire), x, and the 
service provided by local government, g. Household income, y, is exogenously given. We 
assume that users of the service provided by local government incurs the travel cost, so the quantity 
of the service used is equivalent to the frequency of visits. Travel cost is equal to k if a user visits 
the other region to use the service, while no travel cost is incurred for the service within the same 
jurisdiction as the user's residence. Each household chooses the quantity ofthe consumption good 
and the publicly provided service so as to maximize its utility. The behavior of the household is
described as follows. 
      max u(x, g) (1) 
                     x,g 
        s.t. y-t=x+g(f +k) (2) 
where t : head tax 
     f : user fee for a unit of service
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     k : travel cost required for service use. 
By solving the above problem, the demand functions for x and g 
       x=x(f +k,y-t) 
      g=g(f +k,y-t) 
The indirect utility function of the resident is defined as follows. 





2-3 Behavior of a local government 
  Each local government seeks to maximize the utility of its residents, ubject to budget constraint. 
Expenditures toprovide the service are financed by revenue from user fees and taxes. The cost for 
provision consists of a fixed-cost and a variable cost. Fixed costs represent scale economies in 
providing the service. 
  The behavior of a local government is described as a two-stage decision making. At the first 
stage, alocal government decides whether to provide the service or not. The second stage decision 
is to choose the amount of user fees and taxes, in the case that it decides to provide the service in 
the first stage. 
  We first formulate below the second stage behavior, choice of fees and taxes, given the decision 
of the first stage. Note that the decision of the local government in one region depends on the 
policy of another region. Thus from the viewpoint of the government in region i, the following 
four cases are possible outcomes of the first stage decisions by two governments (i and j indicate 
the home region and the other egion, respectively) . 
    [Case A]: The service is provided in both i andj. 
    [Case B]: The service is provided in i but not inj.
    [Case C]: The service is provided in j but not ini.
    [Case D]: Both local governments don't provide the service. 
   Hereafter, superscripts of the variables uch as A, B, C and D indicate the cases tated above, 
and subscripts indicate the regions. For instance to means the tax rate in region i under Case A, 
VA is the utility level of a resident in region i under Case A. 
   [Case A]: The service is provided in both i and j
   In this case, residents in each region use the service provided within their region's jurisdiction.
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Since the quality of the services is the same, there is no reason to use the service in the other egion 
given an additional travel cost. The user fee included in the indirect utility function (4), f , is 
replaced by fiA, the fee charged by its own government. Since residents use the service within 
their home region, no travel cost is required, i.e., k =0. 
  Therefore, the problem to be solved by the government in i is formulated as follows. 
     max V(fjAA) (5) 
            fiA,tA 
       s. t. tAni + f iAni gi = F + yni gi (6a) 
         gi = g(fA,Y _ tA) (6b) 
where ni : population i  region i.
     gi : quantity ofserviceuseby a household in region i 
     F : fixed cost for provision. 
     y : marginal cost 
From the first-order conditions for optimization, wehave 
          V fiA n, g, + fiAni gifiA Yni gifiA 
           V A ni + .fiA ni g;tA - }ryligitA
: 
         aV aV ag 8g 
where. V f
=A = a A , V A = &A , gifiA aj` A , gitA = at i '                 fi i J 3 i 
Applying Roy's identity, gi = V f=A IVA ,the above equation is rewritten as 
       ni (gi giti - gifiA )(fiA - Y) = 0 
  This implies 
       .fiA = Y (7) 
And substituting Eq. (7) to (6a) yields 
          t A = F 
          i (8)             n. 
The financing scheme described by Eq.(7) and (8) is equivalent to the two-part ariff: the fee is 
equal to the marginal cost and the fixed-cost is covered by the tax. 
  Finally, the utility level for Case A is obtained as 
     W =V(fA,Y-tA) (9) 
  [Case B]: The service isprovided in i but not in j. 
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  In this case, the service provided in region i may be used by residents in both regions. The 
local government can impose discriminatory fees for users from two regions. The problem to be 
solved by the government in region i is formulated as follows.
       max V(f;B,y-tB) (10) 
                  BB 'B 
        s . t . tBn, + f,Bn, g; + f,'Bn; g; = F + y(n, g; + n,9,) (11a) 
          g. = g(f,B,Y - tB) (lib)
          g . = g(fiB + k, y) (iic)
where fl'B is the fee applied tousers from the other region. 
Following the procedure similar to Case A, we have 
      f,B =Y (12) 
       fi B =Y - g' (13) 
              g1fB 
                     2
n, 
        ti =-+- F g; , (14) 
              n. g Bn. 
  Comparing Eq. (12) with (13), it turns out hat f;'B > f;B, because g; /g; f,B < 0. This 
implies that the local government charges higher fees for users from the other region. This is 
consistent with the real world practices, such as the case shown in Table 1. On the other hand, in 
Eq. (14), it is seen that tB < F/n; , because g; 2/g; f=B < 0. In other words, taxrate for esidents 
in region i is lower than that in Case A (= F/n; ), since extra revenue from user fees paid by 
residents from the other region partly covers the expenditure for the fixed cost. 
  The utility level is obtained by 
      VB =V(f;B,y-tB) (15) 
  [Case C]: The service is provided in j but not in i. 
  Since the service isnot available within thehome region (i), households use the service in 
another region (j). In this case, the resident i curs atravel cost, k, to use the service. Users 
have to pay the fee, f i'B , that is charged bythe local government providing the service. 
  As the government in i does not incur the expenditure for providing the service, it is not 
necessary to collect taxes, i.e., tc = 0 . 
  Incorporating the above discussion i to Eq. (4), the utility level is obtained as follows. 
                                         -7-
     Vc =V(f;B + k, y) (16) 
  [Case D]: Both local governments don't provide the service. 
  When the service is not provided inboth regions, residents have no opportunity to use the 
service. This case is equivalent to the situation when f + k = 00 . Consequently, households derive 
utility only from consumption of a composite good. 
  Incorporating theabove discussion a d applying tD = 0 to Eq. (4), the utility level of a 
household is obtained by 
      VD =V(00,y) (17)
2-4 Strategies with respect o the provision of the service 
  Each local government has following two alternative strategies: 
 [Strategy S]; provide the service within the jurisdiction, and 
 [Strategy N]; not provide the service. 
Each government chooses the strategy that achieves higher utility level of residents in its 
jurisdiction. 
  Note that the utility level of one region depends on the strategy of the local government in the 
other region. We need to investigate the combinations of strategies taken by two local 
governments. Table 2 summarizes possible patterns of strategies and corresponding utility levels 
in the form of a pay-off matrix.
Table 2 The strategy patterns of two local governments
region 1 / region 2 Provide (S) Not provide (N)
Provide (S) (jJ A VA\' i 2 ) iB IV2 )
Not provide (N) (~J c VB\' i 2 ) f~J D VD\' i 2 )
  In the table, there exists four patterns of strategies, which are expressed hereafter as (S, S), (S, 
N), (N, S), (N, N). For example, (S, N) indicates that region 1 government provides the service 
but region 2 government doesn't. Each cell of the table shows utility levels of two regions. For 
example, (V1B,V2) shown for the pattern (S, N) means that he utility levels of region 1and 2 are
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equal to ViB and V2 , respectively.
n
2-5 Nash equilibrium patterns of provision 
  In this section, we investigatehe conditions that each pattern is realized as a Nash equilibrium. 
To obtain explicit solutions, we specify the form of the utility function as follows. 
       u(x, g) = x + ga (18) 
where a is. a constant with a value within the range of 0 < a < 1. 
  Applying the specification of Eq. (18) to Eqs. (9)(15)(16)(17), the utility levels of the two 
regions are calculated for each strategy pattern. The details are given in appendix A. 
  The conditions that each pattern in Table 2 is realized as a Nash equilibrium are stated as 
follows 
    Pattern (S, S): VVA > ViC and V2 > V 2c 
    Pattern (S, N): ViB > VD and V 2 > V2
    Pattern (N, S): V c> V A and V B> V2D 
     Pattern (N, N): V1D > ViB and V D > VB 
Detailed xpressions f these conditions under the functional form specified byEq. (18) are given 
in Appendix B.
  Basedon the above, we depict in Figure 1the range of parameters within which each pattern is 
realized asa Nash equilibrium.
                               Figure 1 
  FIN is the ratio of the fixed cost o the total population i  the economy, which represents the 
degree of scale economy for service provision. P is the ratio of the population in region 1 to the 
total population (= n/ ). The horizontal axis represents th  population distribution e ween two 
regions. Both governments provide the service, i.e., Pattern (S, S) emerges, when the degree of 
scale economy is small, and the population distribution is relatively even. On the other hand no 
governments provide the service (i. e., Pattern (N, N) emerges), when the degree of scale economy 
is very large. Patterns that only one of the two governments provides the service, such as (S, N) 
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and (N, S), are realized when population distribution isuneven. For example, the Pattern (S, N) is 
likely to emerge as the population of region 1 is relatively large. Multiple equilibria occur if 
parameters take values within the area CDFE in Figure 1, where either Pattern (S, N) or (N, S) can 
be equilibrium. Pattern (S, N) is more efficient han (N, S) if P >1/2, and vice versa. In other 
words, within this range of parameters, it is more efficient hat the service is provided in the region 
with a larger population size. Nevertheless, Nash equilibrium ay lead to an inefficient location 
such that he service is provided in the smaller egion. 
   Let us examine the effects of travel cost, k, on the parameter range shown in Figure 1. An 
increase in travel cost, k, causes expansions of the areas of Patterns (S, S) and (N, N), but 
shrinkages of the areas of Patterns (S, N) and (N, S). As a consequence, the area of multiple 
equilibria, CDFE shrinks. Higher travel costs discourage the use of the service by crossing the 
border between jurisdictions. Therefore, patterns involving trips for service use in the other egion, 
such as (N, S) and (S, N), are less likely. Note that he area of multiple quilibria vanishes as k 
approaches infinity: points C,D, E and Fconverge to (P, F/N) _ ~2,Z(1(yJc~l~. Service uses 
from other region are completely eliminated. 
3. Socially efficient allocation 
  In this section, we formulate and solve the problem to obtain the Pareto optimal provision of 
private good in a two-region economy as a whole, and compare it with the decentralized provision 
obtained in the previous section. Pareto optimum is defined as the situation when the utility of 
residents in region 1 is maximized holding the utility of residents in region 2 at a given level. 
  As in the previous section, there exist four possible patterns of provisions as follows: 
    [Pattern (S, S)]: The service is provided in both regions. 
    [Pattern (S, N)]: The service is provided only inregion 1. 
    [Pattern (N, S)]: The service is provided only in region2.
    [Pattern (N, N)]: No service is provided in this economy 
  We solve the problem by two stages: the first stage is to choose the pattern of provision; the 
second stage is to set the levels of user fees and taxes. The problem is solved backward: given 
each pattern of provision, solve the second stage problem first, then compare the values of the 
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objective functions for four patterns, and finally choose the optimal pattern of provision. 
3-1 Optimal fees and taxes for each pattern 
 Pattern (S, S) 
  In this case, residents in each region use the service provided within the home jurisdiction. 
Thus we consider the problem 
    max V1 =V(f1,Y-t1) (19) 
      fv f2.tvt2 
       s.t. V(f2,y-t2)=v (20a) 
           t1n1 + t2n2 + f1n1g1 +f2n2g2 = 2F + y(n1g1 + n2g2) (20b) 
          g1 = g(f1, Y - t1) (20c)
          g2 = 9(f21 Y - t2) (20d) 
where V is the utility level that residents in region 2 should attain. Eq.(20b) is the budget 
constraint for the two-region economy as a whole. 
  The first order conditions for maximization are reduced to the following 
      f, = y (i =1,2) (21) 
        t1 - 2F - tn2 (22           = )
               nl 
       t2 = t (23) 
where, t is the tax rate that is determined soas to satisfy Eq. (20a). Note that Eq. (21) is 
equivalent to Eq. (7), and t; = F/n; is a special case of Eqs. (22) and (23). This implies that he 
user fee and tax rate are set efficiently when Pattern (S, S) emerges in equilibrium. 
  Pattern (S, N) 
   In this case, the service provided in region 1 may be used by residents in both regions. Users 
from region 2 incur the travel cost k, and have to pay the fee fi . Thus the problem tobe solved 
in this case is formulated as follows. 
        max V1 =V(f1,y-t1) (24) 
             fi, fi ,tl,t2 
         s . t . V (f,' + k, y - t2) = V (25a) 
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s 
D
            t1n1 + tang + f1n1g1 +fl 'n292 = F + y (n1g1 + naga) (25b) 
            g1 = g(.f1, y - t1) (25c)
           g2 = g(fi + k, y - t2) (25d) 
From the. first order conditions for optimization, we have 
       .f1 = Y (26) 
        Y (27) 
and Eq. (22) and (23) 
  The result of Eq. (26), (27) implies that the fees for users in region 1 and 2 should not be 
differentiated, and should be equal to the marginal cost for provision. This is in contrast with the 
results obtained in the previous ection that local government charges adiscriminatory fee for users 
from the other egion. In other words, the discriminatory pricing is not efficient. 
 Pattern (N, S) 
  This pattern is symmetry to pattern (S, N). Thus we omit the discussion. 
 Pattern (N, N) 
   Since no service is provided in this case, the control variables are taxes set by each government 
which are needed to adjust the utility levels of two regions. Therefore, the problem to be solved is 
formulated as follows. 
      max V1 = V (x, y -t1) (28) 
          442 
         s. t. V(00' y - t2) = V (29a) 
            t1n1 + t2n2 = 0 (29b)
   The values of control variables, t1 and t2 ,are determined autonomously by Eq. (29a) and 
(29b), as follows 
        t1= - n2 t (30) 
              n1 
       t2 =t (31) 
  The transfer between the two regions should be made so that the utility level of region 2 is equal 
to 117.
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3-2 Optimal pattern of provision 
  The analysis nthis section is based on the specification f Eq. (18). Let us denote by V1(S'S) 
V1(S,N) , V1(N'S) , Vi("') the values of each objective function, i.e., the utility levels of region 1 for 
the four provision patterns, which are maximized with respect to user fees and taxes. Appendix C 
provides the detailed expressions. 
  The conditions for which each pattern becomes an optimal solution are stated as follows. 
     Pattern (S, S): V (S'S) - Vlcs'N> > 0 , Vl(s'S) - V1(N'S) > 0 and Vl(s'S) - V1(N'N) > 0 
     Pattern (S, N): V (S'N) - V (S'S) >0 , V,(S'N) - V1 (N'S) >0 and V (S' 1) - V1(N'N)> 0
     Pattern (N, S): V (N'S) - V (S'S) >0 , V (N'S) - V (S'N) >0 and V (N'S) - V (N,N)> 0
     Pattern (N, N): V (N'N) - V (S'S) >0 , V (N'N) - V (S'N) >0 and V (N'N) - V (N'S)> 0
  Detailed xpressions f these conditions under the functional form specified byEq. (18) are 
given i  Appendix D. 
  Based on theabove, we depict inFigure 2 the range of parameters within which each pattern is 
Pareto optimum. 
                              Figure 2
  Providing the service inboth regions (i.e., Pattern (S, S)) is optimal when the degree ofscale 
economies is smaller, and the population distribution is relativity even. On the other hand, no 
provision (i.e., Pattern (N, N)) is optimal when the degree of scale conomies is larger. Providing 
the service in one of two regions, such as (S, N) and (N, S), is optimal when the degree of scale 
economies is moderate. In this case, the rule is that the service should be located in the region 
with the larger size. 
   The ffects oftravel cost, k , on the parameter range ofeach pattern are qualitatively similar to
the situations i  equilibrium: theareas of patterns i volving the service uses in the other region 
shrink as travel cost increase. 
3-3 Comparison between optimum and equilibrium 
  Figure 3 is obtained by superposing F gure 2 on Figure 1.
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Figure 3
  In Figure 3, areas of each pattern in equilibrium do not coincide with those in optimum. The 
area of Pattern (S, S) in equilibrium is larger than that in optimum. When the parameters take 
values within the area CBIA, the service is provided in both regions in equilibrium while it would 
be efficient hat only one of two regions has the service. This implies that the decentralized 
decision making causes over-provision ofservices. Recall that the local government providing the 
service charges discriminatory fees for users from the other region. This induces the local 
government to have the service itself so as to avoid welfare reduction of residents within its 
jurisdiction due to the discriminatory fee. When the scale economy is relatively small, the benefit 
of avoiding a discriminatory fee is likely to exceed the provision cost from the viewpoint of 
individual government. On the other hand, the area of pattern (N, N) at equilibrium is larger than 
that in optimum. When the parameter values fall within the area J FG, the service is not provided 
in both regions in equilibrium while it is efficient hat one of two regions has the service, implying 
under-provision in decentralized decision making. 
  When multiple equilibria occur, decentralized decision making may lead to an extremely 
inefficient outcome: for example, within the area FCD, the service may be located in region 1 while 
it is efficient that he service is located in region 2. 
  Areas of equilibrium and optimal patterns coincide when k = oo.
4. Conclusion
h
  This paper focuses on the role of local governments in providing services which are categorized 
into private good. We investigate he equilibrium solution as an outcome of decentralized decision 
making by local governments and evaluate social efficiency of such equilibrium. The results 
obtained are summarized as follows: 
    (1) In the case thatonly one of two regions provides the service under decentralized 
     provision, the local government acting as provider imposes discriminatory fees for users 
    from the other region. This is consistent with real world practice (see Table 1), but such
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    pricing is inefficient. 
    (2) Decentralized decision making with respect o provision is not necessarily efficient: 
     either over-provision or under-provision may occur depending on the degree of scale 
     economy. 
    (3) There exists the possibility of multiple quilibria under decentralized provision. In this 
     situation, inefficient location of the service may emerge. 
  The decentralized decision making causes inefficient allocation as shown above. One policy 
response isthat he central government itself provides uch services. This scheme attains the first 
best allocation by choosing the fee and the tax in such a way as was derived in Section 3, as long as 
the central government is sufficiently capable and rational. Such situation is unthinkable, and 
advocating centralization is not our intention. We need to develop the second best policy under 
which the central government intervenes inthe decision process of local governments bymeans of 
tax-subsidy or other instruments. It is essential to affect pricing policies of local governments, in 
order to correct distortion with respect to the pattern of provision. 
  Introducing externality effects into the analysis is also an important extension. In many cases, 
presence of externality is the main reason that local governments provide the services categorized as
private good. It would be interesting to see how such extensions affect he results obtained in this 
paper.
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Appendix A: The utility levels under decentralized decision mating for each provision pattern 
    Pattern (S, S) 
a 
                                  Y a--~        region 1 V1 Y - F + (1- a) - (Ala) 
                            n1 a 
a 
        region 2 VA = y2 - F + (1- a) a-i                          Y (Alb) 
                              n2 a 
    Pattern (S, N) 
                                                       a a 
        region 1 V1B = y - F + (1- a) Y a-1-1 + n2 a-1                           a y2k (A2a) 
                            n1 a n1 a 
a 
C        region 2 V2 = y + (1- a) y + 2 k as-1 (A2b) 
 
    Pattern (N, S) 
                          y +k        region 1 V
1C = y + (1- a) 2 a-i (A3a) 
                                                        a a 
       region 2 V B = y - F + (l -a) Y a-1 +n1 a y 2k as1 (A3b) 
                            n2 a n2 a 
    Pattern (N, N) 
       region 1 V' = y (A4a) 
      region 2 V D = y (A4b) 
Appendix B: Conditions for each provision pattern to emerge as an equilibrium solution 
   Let us define P = n1 / N, and use the relation N = n1 + n2 in the process of derivation. 
    Pattern (S, S) 
                                  a a 
        F 
< P(l - a) y a-1 - y +k a-1 (Bla) 
      N a a
- 16 -
                                         a a 
         F Y «-1-~ y + k «-~ 
       N < (1_P)(1-a) a - a2 
    Pattern (S, N) 
                                a a 
  F <P(1-a Y a-1 +(17P)a(1-a Y +k a-1 
      N S 2 a 
                                         a a 
         F y «-1-1 y + k «-1-1 
      N > (1-P)(1-a) a - a2 
    Pattern (N, S) 
                                   a a 
                              --y + k «-1-1     fV7.P(i_a){(1_)a1 - 2                  a a 
                                       a a 
                                                                        a -1      F<(1-PXl-a) F a-1 +Pa(1-a y +k 
      N a a2 
     Pattern (N, N) 
                                  a a 
       F > P(1- a) y «-1 + (1- P)a(1- a) Y + k a-.1 
                a a2 N      () (-) 
                                       a a                       }/a-1 y-Fk)a-1                                  -a 
2       N F >(1-PX1-a a - +Pa(1 a 
Appendix C: The utility level of region 1 in Pareto optimum for each provision pattern 
    Pattern (S, S) 
a 
    S'S) 1+n2 Y+ a) Y a-1 _2F _n2V 
                     n1 a n1 n1 
    Pattern (S, N) 
                                                 a a 
         V1~S'N) = 1+n2 y + (1 _a) Y a-1 + n2 y + k a-1 - F - n2 V 
                      n1 a n1 a n1 n1 










    Pattern (N, S) 
                                                       « a 
        Vi(NS) 1+n2 y+(1-a) 1 2 Y «-~+ Y+k a-1 -F -n2V 
                     ni ni a a n1 ni 
    Pattern (N, N) 
        V2(N,N)= 1+n2 y - n2 V 
                     ni nl 
Appendix D: Conditions for each provision pattern to be the optimal solution 
    Pattern (S, S) 
                                         a a 
         F y «-1-1 y + k «-1 
      N <(1-PX1-a) a a 
                                  a a 
                       y «-1-1 y + k «-i        F <P(1-a) - -
      N a a 
    Pattern (S, N) 
                                         a a 
        F >(1-PX1-a) Y «-1-i - y+k a-1 
      N a a 
      P>1/2 
        F <P(1-a) y «-1-1 +(1-PX1-a) y +k a-1 
      N a a 
    Pattern (N, S) 
                                    a a 
F 
       >P(1 - a)Y a-1 (r+kyii} 
-
      N a a 
      P < 1/2 
                                      a a 
        F <(1-<(l-a y «-1 +P(1-a) y +k «-1 
      N a a 











Pattern (N, N) 
a 
   F >P(1-a) y a-1-1 +(1-PX1-a 
  N a 
   F >(l-PX1-a y «-1 +P(1-a 
  N a
y+k 
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Table-1 Entrance fees for local public universities in Japan
For student from 
home region
For student from 
other regions
Fukushima medical university 
Nara Medical University 
Wakayama Medical College 
Ibaraki Prefectural University 
            of Health Sciences 
The University of Aizu 
Aomori Public College 
Prefectural University of Kumamoto 
Siebold University of Nagasaki 
Kochi Women's University 
Saitama Prefectural University 
University of Shizuoka 
Shimonoseki City University 
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Pattern (S, S) emerges when parameters fall within the area ACB. 
Pattern (S, N) emerges when parameters fall within the area BDH. 
Pattern (N, S) emerges when parameters fall within the area AGE. 
Pattern (N, N) emerges when parameters fall within the area above the line GFH.





   a a 
 )a-l-1 +~y+akja-1
{(a




II     (II
IIIIIII
IIIII
I (N, N)    11111
111111














       H 
1111, 

















Pattern (S, S) emerges when parameters fall within the area AIB. 
Pattern (S, N) emerges when parameters fall within the area BIJH. 
Pattern (N, S) emerges when parameters fall within the area AUG. 
Pattern (S, N) emerges when parameters fall within the area above the line GJH.
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 Boundary dividing parameter ranges of different patterns in equilibrium 
 Boundary dividing parameter ranges of different patterns for optimum 
Fig. 3 Comparison between decentralized equilibrium and social optimum
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